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SANCTIONS AND EFFICACY IN ANALYTIC JURISPRUDENCE

Brenner M. Fissell*
ABSTRACT

Legal theory has long grappled with the question of what
features a rule system must have for it to be considered '7aw."
Over time, a consensus has emerged that might seem
counterintuitive to most people: a legal system does not require
punishment for the disobedience of its rules (sanctions"), nor
must it be obeyed by the people it purports to apply to (it need not
have "efficacy'). In this Article, I do not challenge these
conclusions, but instead stake out an attempt to reconcile these
claims with other intuitions about law. I argue that while
neither sanctions nor efficacy are alone determinative of legal
validity, legal systems must at least aspire to be efficacious.
Sanctions, then, may be seen as but one optional manifestation
of the crucial background quality they represent: a readiness to
adapt and react to the external realities surrounding a legal
system's attempted implementation.
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I. INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this Article is to engage in a sustained scrutiny of
the various arguments made when analyzing two interrelated concepts
in analytic jurisprudence. First, it is generally thought (with notable
exceptions) that in order to be "law," a rule-system does not need to
back up the obligations it imposes with sanctions for disobedience.'
Similarly, the efficacy of such a system-its obedience by the populace
in the real world-is also thought to be unnecessary.
After surveying these arguments, though, where does this leave us?
Theorists have convincingly argued that these two qualities are not
necessary for legal validity, but these arguments do little to construct
an account of legality that accords with the commonly held intuitions of
most people. Most people would not think that any person with
Microsoft Word could create a system of "law" simply by typing up rules
and pressing "save."
I do not claim that this means the entire analytic project should
2
modify its methods (and become sociological, rather than conceptual);
instead, I argue that traditional analytic methods yield a more
persuasive result when the debates about "sanctions" and "efficacy" are
viewed side-by-side. Arguments positing the necessity or superfluity of
sanctions or efficacy each individually present only a snippet view of the
larger whole, and distract from something more fundamental. When
read together, a common feature emerges from seemingly disparate
projects-one that may be able to combine the persuasive elements of
extreme positions to form a middle ground compromise.
I argue that such a middle ground is this: while sanctions or efficacy
might not individually be necessary for legal validity, what is necessary
is that a system of rules aspire to be efficacious and that it manifest
that aspiration by adapting to the circumstances in which it expects to
be applied. Thus, most legal systems will aspire to be efficacious
through the use of sanctions; but this is not always the case (if efficacy
can be achieved without sanctions). Moreover, a rule system may or
may not be obeyed by most of its citizens, but if it is severely lacking in
efficacy, we expect a "legal" system to try to do something about it. This
is usually achieved by imposing sanctions, but even if such measures
failed to change the way people acted, this attempt to create efficacy
nevertheless imbues the rule system with legal validity.

1. See generally FREDERICK SCHAuER, THE FORCE OF LAW (2015). Schauer's critique
will be discussed more in Part II.
2. See generally id.
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This Article proceeds as follows. Part I will begin with a brief
discussion of the background debates surrounding sanctions and
efficacy. This will lay the groundwork for the first part of the inquiry, in
Part H, which will focus on a comparison of simplified thought
experiments. By juxtaposing various hypothetical situations that are
intuitively legal and non-legal, a tentative version of the above thesis
emerges. In Part III, this inchoate position will be fleshed out by way of
positive argument, creating a more nuanced theory. After this
formulation, the theory will be tested in Part IV by an application to
social practices that are more complicated than the hypotheticals from
which it arose. From this, important but non-fatal qualifiers will be
discovered.
II. COMMON ARGUMENTS & BACKGROUND
A brief sketch of the major relevant debates in analytic
jurisprudence will lay some foundation. Efficacy-the actual obtaining
of a system of rules in reality, such that those rules make a difference in
human thought and conduct 3-has varied in its conceptual importance
over time.
Hans Kelsen, coming before most of the mainline positivists who
currently influence jurisprudence, made it a critical feature in his
theory of law. While he agreed with later theorists that the legality of a
particular norm is separate from its efficacy, 4 he argued that the
validity of a general system does require it: "A norm is considered to be
valid only on the condition that it belongs to a system of norms, to an
order which, on the whole, is efficacious. Thus, efficacy is a condition of
validity . . .. "5
3. See Joshua Kleinfeld, Enforcement and the Concept ofLaw, 121 YALE L.J. 293, 301
& n.15 (2011) (discussing various uses of the term in the modern literature); Grant
Lamond, Coercion and the Nature of Law, 7 LEGAL THEORY 35, 45 (2001) (stating that
efficacy denotes a sufficient degree of conformity with the laws, butalso thatconformity
resultfrom the laws; I do not think the latter is necessary).
4. HANs KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAw AND STATE 30, 122 (Anders Wedberg
trans. 1945) ("Thus, in the particular case, the rule is valid . . . even if it is without
efficacy . . . .'); see also id. at 122 ("That the validity of a legal order depends upon its

efficacy does not imply, as pointed out, that the validity of a single norm depends upon its
efficacy.').
5. Id. at 42. In discussing a new constitution in light of an older one, or a revolution
supplanting a prior system, Kelsen writes:
[W]e find that the norms of the old order are regarded as devoid of validity
because the old constitution and, therefore, the legal norms based on this
constitution, the old legal order as a whole, has lost its efficacy. . .. Every single
norm loses its validity when the total legal order to which it belongs loses its
efficacy as a whole.
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H.L.A. Hart's theory revised this latter conclusion in a nuanced, but
substantial way. Hart argued that Kelsen was correct in his assessment
of the particular case,6 but so too should he have extended this
conclusion to the system as a whole: "It would however be wrong to say
that the statements of validity 'mean' that the system is generally
efficacious." 7 While Hart felt compelled to admit that general efficacy is
"the normal context for making statements of validity," and that
without such a context "no meaningful statement of validity can be
made," there were nevertheless special circumstances, such as those
involving past or future systems, which could be considered valid even
without efficacy. 8 In making what may have been intended as more of a
minor point about outlier cases, though, Hart drove a definitive wedge
between efficacy and legal validity: this external phenomenon or
reaction did not inhere in law's meaning, and it was explicitly demoted
from the "sine qua non" status it had earlier enjoyed.9
Other thinkers would follow suit. Two years after The Concept of
Law, Lon Fuller stated, "What law must foreseeably do to achieve its
aims is something quite different from law itself."1 0 More recently,
Grant Lamond wrote, "But that certain conditions must obtain [for
existence] does not show that the law must make provision for their
obtaining." 11 On the whole, discussions of efficacy have dropped off of
the radar-it is likely that, at least in Hartian positivist circles, a
general consensus has been reached and that Kelsen's wooden
insistence on this feature has been abandoned.
Arguments against the essential nature of efficacy are often made
alongside those denying the conceptual necessity of sanctions. Because
sanctions are usually presupposed to be necessary for the purpose of
achieving efficacy, 12 undermining the need for one tends to undermine
the need for the other. While there are suggestions in The Concept of

Id. at 118-19.
6. As Hart writes, "If by 'efficacy' is meant that the fact that a rule of law which
requires certain behaviour is obeyed more often than not, it is plain that there is no
necessary connection between the validity of a particular rule and its efficacy . . ." H. L.A
HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 103 (2d ed. 1994) (emphasis in original).
7. Id. at 104.
8. Id. at 295 (discussing this concept in the "Notes" section of the book, which
supports propositions discussed elsewhere); see also id. at 103-04.
9. Id. at 295; see also id. at 103-04.
10.

LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAw 108 (1964).

11. Lamond, supranote 3, at 50.
12. Id. at 43. Lamond writes that coercion is most often employed to explain
normativity or efficacy. See generallyid.
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Law that might confuse the reader on this point, 13 the mainstream
position in jurisprudence understands sanctions to be merely "natural
necessities" external to the concept of law itself 1 4-lamentable
instruments required only in a human legal system, given the way
humans seem to be constituted. As with its cousin, efficacy, the sanction
is no longer seen as having any necessary import for legal validity.
In a more recent article by Scott Shapiro and Oona Hathaway,
three common arguments against the conceptual necessity of sanctions
are summarized: empirical studies about the motivations for lawabidingness, the existence of a large body of public law governing
official action that is not directly backed by sanctions, and finally, a
thought experiment. 15 We will focus on the third. This thought
experiment, what we could call the "angelic polity," was first referenced
by H.L.A. Hart in an early talk but later incorporated into The Concept
of Law; since then it has been similarly advanced by Joseph Raz, John
Finnis, Scott Shapiro. 16 It goes something like this: in a hypothetical

13. For example, Hart often writes of the necessity of serious "social pressure" exerted
upon the disobedient, but take note of the context of that discussion:
Rules are conceived and spoken of as imposing obligations when the general
demand for conformity is insistent and the social pressure brought to bear upon
those who deviate or threatento deviate is great.... Whatis important is that
the insistence on importance or seriousnessof social pressure behind the rules is
the primary factor determining whether they are thought of as giving rise to
obligations.
HART, supranote 6, at 86-87 (emphasis added). This is not about validity, but obligation.
14. Id. at 199. Cf. id. at 200 (exempting that the need for sanctions is a contingent
one-"contingent on human beings and the world they live in, retaining the salient
characteristics they have"); JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 262 (1980)
(stating that a legal sanction is a "human response to human needs'); JOSEPH RAZ, THE
CONCEPT OF ALEGAL SYSTEM 156 (1970) [hereinafter THE CONCEPT OF ALEGAL SYSTEM]
(implying that legal sanctions are outside of law when he states that every D-law does not
need corresponding S-law). See also JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS 158
(1999) [hereinafter PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS] (stating that the idea of sanctions
arises from empirical generalizations and do not represent a logical feature of the concept
of law; a sanctionless system is "humanly impossible but logically possible").
15. Scott J. Shapiro & Oona Hathaway, Outcasting:Enforcement in Domestic and
InternationalLaw, 121 YALE L.J. 252,277-79 (2011). See Lamond, supranote 3, at 53, for
a discussion of public law as sanctionless duties.
16. Jonathan Cohen& H.L.A Hart, Theory and Definition in Jurisprudence,29 PRO C.
OF THE ARISTOTELIAN SOC'Y, SUPPLEMENTARY VOLUMES 213, 253 (1955); HART, supra note
6, at 103; FINNIS, supranote 14, at 267 ("[The features of law are distinguishable] even in
the absence of any problem of recalcitrance and hence of any need for coercion or
sanctions." Describing the main features of the rule of law without sanctions, he
concludes, "Allthis, then, stands as a sufficiently distinctive, self-contained, intelligible,
and practically significant social arrangement which would have acompletely adequate
rationale in a world of saints."); SCOTT J. SHAPIRO, LEGALITY 167-70 (2011); PRACTICAL
REASON AND NORMS, supranote 14, at 159.
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community where all citizens have a perfectly law-abiding disposition,
assuming that they would still indeed need law (for coordination, etc.),
that system of rules has no need for sanctions. As Shapiro writes, in
this angelic polity such measures would be "otiose," 17 and given that the
system of rules already in place is clearly legal, sanctions must be
irrelevant to the question of legal validity. Sanctions are not necessary
features of law.
This argument is persuasive, but has not been entirely accepted. A
number of commentators have criticized the methodology underlying
the angelic polity thought experiment. As Jeremy Waldron counters, "In
the real world, sanctions and the deliberate and public activity of
legislatures are both definitive features of law. Their prominence . .
may vary from system to system, but their presence is indispensable to
the ordinary notion of law." 18 The "real" world, the "ordinary" notionthese are what jurisprudence should be concerned about, because we
are not angels but are human beings: "Law is a man-made institution
and its central norms are human artifacts .

. .

. [Wihen we think of law

as a mode of governance, we think of it as something humans have set
up . . . ."19

Another recent objection comes from Ekow Yankah. He seems to
reject outright that the angelic polity does have law. Whatever they do
have is simply "different," and to accept it as law "would radically alter
our concept of law." 20 He rests this proposition on something similar to
Schauer: "This response is rooted in the traditional claim that the goal
of jurisprudence is descriptive as opposed to prescriptive. That claim
states that we should describe the law as it is, not as it could be." 21
Frederick Schauer presents a sustained treatment of his objections
in a recent book, The Force of Law, 22 and does so by liberating himself

17.
18.
19.

SHAPIRO, supranote 16, at 169.
Jeremy Waldron, The Conceptand the Rule of Law, 43 GA. L. REV. 1, 30 (2008).
Id. Shapiro sees this human-centric approach as a weakness. He states:

Social science cannot tell us what the law is because it studies human society. Its
deliverances have no relevance to the legal philosopher because it is a truism that
nonhumans could have law. Science fiction, for example, is replete with stories
involving alien civilizations with some form of legal system. These examples show
that it is part of our concept of law that groups can have legal systems provide d
they are more or less rational agents and have the ability to follow rules.
See SHAPIRO, supra note 16, at 406-07.

20. See Ekow N. Yankah, The Forceof Law: The Role of Coercionin Legal Norms, 42
U. RICH. L. REV. 1195, 1237 (2008).
21. Id. at 1237 n.188. Lamond even hints at agreement with these objectors as well:
while he ultimately accepts the angelic polity, he still says it is "not clear how to extend to
such societies our concept of law." See Lamond, supra note 3, at 46.
22. See SCHAUER, supranote 1.
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from the methods of conceptual analysis that constrain the theorists he
critiques. Schauer rejects Shapiro's attempt to find "law's nature" by
"discover [ing] its necessary properties," 23 instead arguing that we
should "focus on the typical rather than the necessary features" of law.24
Schauer thus admits that the concept of law "is not completely captured
by a coercion-based account," given the possibility of the angelic polity,
but that coercion is nevertheless centrally important 25: "Coercion may
be to law what flying is to birds: not strictly necessary but so ubiquitous
that a full understanding of the phenomenon requires that we consider
it."26 This is because it will be "empirically rare" to find a society where
a "critical mass of obedient subjects" will obey the law merely because it
is law and not because of any sanction. 27
Evaluating the soundness of these objections would take us beyond
the scope of this paper, which accepts and deploys the analytic methods
used by Shapiro and Hart. It is worth noting, though, that the analytic
positivists would see these critiques as having fundamentally mistaken
their jurisprudential project. As Raz states, the inquiry is into the
features of "any legal system," and is therefore distinct from pure
sociology. 28
In conclusion, while Hartian positivists have essentially jettisoned
efficacy and sanctions from the concept of law, some flickers of
opposition do arise. The two sides have reached an impasse, though,
and none seem able to bridge the gap. Raz describes the divide well in a
section of The Authority of Law called "The Relation of Existence and
Efficacy of Laws"-here he speaks of "existence" in the same way that
we speak of validity. "At one extreme," Raz writes, "is the claim that a
law created in the appropriate manner exists and is valid; its efficacy or
inefficacy does not affect its existence and validity . . . ."29 On the
opposite side "is the argument that the laws exist because and to the
extent that they are socially accepted and followed; social customs are
laws even if not enacted, whereas enacted law is not valid if it has no
roots in social practices."30
In searching for a middle ground between the extremes of the
efficacy-sanctions debate, something new must be introduced to break
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

SHAPIRO, supranote 16, at 9.
SCHAUER, supranote 1, at 4.
Id. at 30-32.
Id. at 40.
Id. at 56.
See THE CONCEPT OF ALEGAL SYSTEM, supra note 14, at 168.
See JOSEPH RAZ, The Nature of Law and Natural Law, in THE AUTHORITY OF LAW

35, 85 (1979) [hereinafter The Nature ofLaw and NaturalLaw].
30.

Id. at 86.
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the impasse-something that can reconcile the commonly held intuition
about law having real-world impact with the equally convincing
thought experiments suggesting such impact is irrelevant. In what
follows, I discuss what this addition might look like, and how we would
come to discern it. Though I find the angelic polity very persuasive, I
still find that something would be missing were we to uncritically and
wholeheartedly assent to the mainstream positivist position just stated.
While these thinkers have convincingly demonstrated the errors of
accepting a hardline position on either efficacy or sanctions-thus
refuting the theories of Kelsen and the sanction theorists-we ought not
ignore the strong intuitions that seem to pull in the opposite direction,
and motivate more pragmatic thinkers such as Waldron and Schauer.
Facing this dilemma, it is helpful to search for a path between the
divergent poles.
III. THOUGHT EXPERIMENTS: ANGELIC POLITIES AND DEMONIC POLITIES
To work toward this, we can begin by noting a weakness in the
angelic polity hypothetical. What does it really tell us? By positing a
perfectly law-abiding populace, the thought experiment purports to
establish that sanctions are unnecessary for legal validity, but this
seems to be because efficacy is taken for granted. 31 What would we say
if the angels suddenly revolted, becoming disobedient and fractious? 32
The conclusion probably changes: this, it seems, looks like a community
of humans, but ruled over by a system that lacks the sanctions that
seem so necessary given their wayward tendencies. It would be difficult
to call this "law." When efficacy is undermined, then, our conclusions
about the sanctionless angelic polity come out differently, yet we know
from earlier that it cannot be efficacy that is the touchstone of validity.

31. The hypothetical is somewhat unclear as to why the angels obey-is it because
they are perfectly law-abiding or is it because they, being angels, agree with all of the
existing laws that are happily angelic in their quality? I think that angelicism in the
thought experiments stands for the former. The law does therefore make a difference in
theirconduct, andthey wouldobeyitif it changed. Itis notjust a happy coincidence that
law and disposition align: the disposition to law -abidingness is what matters. As Shapiro
writes in his own version, "The islanders all accept the legitimacy of the group plans and,
as a result, abide by them. And when they make mistakes, theyvoluntarily make amends.
Sanctions would simply be otiose in such a setting." SHAPIRO, supranote 16, at 169. They
all accept the "legitimacy" of the plans, not necessarily their substance, andobeyfor that
reason. This reading also accords with Shapiro's earlier emphasis on the choice between
neutral or arbitrary alternatives.
32. See Yankah, supra note 20, at 1236. "If one (fallen) angel inexplicably decided to
disobey those edicts, the inability of any structure to even theoretically compel him to
obey would cast serious doubt on the system's claim to be the law." Id.
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The angelic polity is clearly of limited use. While it can defeat the
claims of theorists who argue for the conceptual necessity of sanctions
for the sake of efficacy, 33 it does so at the expense of making efficacy a
given, and says nothing about why it is not conceptually necessary.
I propose a supplement to the angelic polity-one that can help us
to understand the status of both sanctions and efficacy. By looking more
closely at two opposite poles along a sanction-efficacy matrix, as well as
their intermediaries, we can discern a feature underlying both concepts.
In doing so, we see that neither are conceptually necessary to legal
validity, yet there is something behind them that is (perhaps the
elusive "middle ground" mentioned above). The variables we will work
with are (1) law-abidingness, and (2) sanctions.
The first pole is our familiar angelic polity, but in this version the
perfectly law-abiding beings have instituted a system of rules that
sanctions disobedience nonetheless-we could call this "angelic-polity
plus." In this situation, when compared to the regular, sanctionless
angelic polity, it seems that the addition of the sanctions changes
nothing about the validity of the system or rules: both clearly have law.
In both cases, law-abidingness is at its apex, and the legal system is
perfectly adapted for the nature of its citizenry, or may even have
superfluous protections.
The inverse extreme is something new-the demonic polity. In this
situation, the entire citizenry has a content-neutral disposition to lawdisobedience, and yet the legal system provides for no sanctions. Thus,
the law is entirely inefficacious, and does not attempt to counteract the
disobedience even in theory, let alone in actual practical application.
Here, there is clearly no law. Without importing any connotations from
our "demonic" label, we could draw an analogy to the existence of the
conduct rules of the Catholic Church in a polity entirely composed of
pagans or druids. 34 With law-abidingness at its nadir, and the
simultaneous absence of any provision for sanctions or enforcement in
the rule-system, there is no law.
So far, we have considered three scenarios: an angelic polity with
sanctions, and both a demonic polity and an angelic polity without
them. Now, let us turn to the final possibility, and alter the demonic
polity a bit-let's say that this new "demonic polity" provides for (but
does not actually apply) sanctions. Here, law-abidingness continues to
be nil, but the rule system at least makes an effort to respond to that
33. See, e.g., Lamond, supra note 3, at 42-43 (discussing the variants of sanction
theory).
34. Kleinfeld, supra note 3, at 295 (writing that law must surely be more than
"political advocacy" or "moral exhortation").
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reality. I think that most would agree that this system is a legal one (we
will see why later), even though it is clearly inefficacious and does not
"exist." This situation is essentially the same as two of Hart's "special"
examples of inefficacious but valid legal systems: "[Inefficacy] may be so
complete in character and so protracted .

.

. in the case of a new system,

that it had never established itself as the legal system of a given group,
or in the case of a once-established system, that it had ceased to be the
legal system of the group." 35 Even when a system is totally inefficacious,
if it exists in theory as either a nostalgic (or hated) remnant of the past,
or perhaps as a wistful project for the future, Hart believes it is still
"legal." His two examples are the White Russian, hoping to one day
restore the old legal regime he had lived under, and the professor of
Roman law, speaking of that system as "law" even though it no longer
exists at all in our time. 36 These systems were indeed efficacious at one
time, but are no longer. We might also think of contemporary "failed
states," where their promulgated rules have almost no efficacy, but are
still considered laws. Importantly, the failed state, this second iteration
of the demonic polity, the White Russian, and professor of Roman law
all involve presently inefficacious legal systems that nevertheless make
internal, theoretical attempts to be efficacious, usually by providing for
sanctions in cases of disobedience. All of these systems make
adaptations given the circumstances in which they are expected to be
implemented. Were any of these systems to be sanctionless, they would
probably not be considered legal. Then, they would just be like the
Church code in the pagan country, or like the first iteration of the
demonic polity (both non-legal systems).
It may be helpful to illustrate these various conclusions
graphically3 7 :

35. HART, supranote 6, at 103.
36. Id. at 104.
37. Figure 1 was compiled by Brenner M. Fissell based on his research. See discussion
supra Part II.
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Figure 1

Law-abidineness
Perfect

None

No

Not Law
-Demonic Polity,
-Church Code in
Pagan Country

Law
-Angelic Polity

Law
-Failed State
-Past/Future
Systems
-Demonic Politv2

Law
-Angelic Polity
Plus (with "otiose"
measures)

Sanctions

Yes

What seems apparent from the amalgamation of this sanctionefficacy matrix, and from the various thought experiments that many
have found to be persuasive, is that there seems to be a hidden variable
at work. It is not merely external efficacy, nor is it the presence of
sanctions that is determinative of legality in the ultimate instance.
There must be something else going on-something that can explain
why the angelic polity that provides for no sanctions suddenly loses its
legal status as soon as the angels become demons. Sanctions are absent
both before and after "the Fall," but legality changes. However, our
discussion of demonic polity 38 and the failed state shows that efficacy
cannot be determinative either. While neither efficacy nor sanctions are
part of the concept of law, by looking at them together we can see that
there is something that lies behind them that is.
I argue that this is an aspiration of efficacy, and its corollary, which
is an adaptability that seeks to further that aspiration. This manifests
internally-the legal system constitutes itself so as to advance efficacy
given its expected circumstances of instantiation (this is measured, of
course, at the time of the expected application). In almost all cases

38.

See discussion supra Partl; supra Figure 1, at 2.
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involving human beings, this means the inclusion of critical reactions to
disobedience (usually sanctions), but we can imagine many other tools.
By looking to this quality, we find a coherent way to delineate
between our various hypothetical situations. What distinguishes
demonic polity39 from the failed state is that in the latter, the law
aspires to rectify what is lacking by providing for an instrumental
remedy: sanctions. The same is true of the angelic polity and the
demonic polity 40 (after the "Fall")-in the former, the sanctionless
system is already adapted to its circumstances, but its failure to
respond to the exterior change in the citizenry dooms it to non-legal
status. By sitting on its hands in the face of such widespread
this
system has abandoned its efficacious aim.
disobedience,
Meanwhile, in the case of the past or future systems (e.g. the White
Russian, the Roman Law, etc.), their present inefficacy does not damn
them to invalidity, as they are internally adapted to present
circumstances (they have critical responses to disobedience, for
example): their inefficacy flows not from an absence of such
adaptations, but from external factors.4 1
It should now be clear why I referred earlier to the debates about
sanctions and efficacy as "distractions"; by analyzing them together we
find that what is really determinative of legal validity is not either in
isolation, but the underlying aspiration that one variable manifests
when confronted by the other. Sanctions are but means to an endefficacy-but this end's realization is not a necessary condition for
legality.
IV. ASPIRATIONS OF EFFICACY: THE CONCEPT

So far, we have used thought experiments to isolate what may be a
hidden variable at work in legality, but more must still be said about it
by way of positive argument. Just as Raz meets with skepticism when
proposing that law must "claim" authority, 42 so too might a theory
positing an "aspiration" in a legal system appear similarly suspect.
Humans can aspire to something, but laws, so it seems, cannot. Like
Raz, though, I believe we must take a wide-angle view of what the
39. See discussion supraPart I; supraFigure 1, at 1.
40. See discussion supraPartl;supraFigure 1, at 1.
41. I think it is unhelpful to understand the old systems as going out of "existence"
after the new circumstances arise or as not "existing" before the hoped for circumstance s
are realized. The systems of rules clearly still "exist," as we can talk about them and
analyze them.
42. JOSEPH RAZ, Authority, Law, and Morality, in ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN:
ESSAYS IN THE MORALITY OF LAW AND POLITIcS 210,210-21(1994).
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statutory or common law rcheme is doing (and why), and that such
information can inform the concept of law itself.43 Unlike him, though, I
do not believe that officials' statements, judges' rationalizations, or
preambles need to be consulted to determine a system's aspirations.44 I
would look solely at how the law constitutes itself internally, such as in
the theoretical provision for S- and P-laws so as to increase the efficacy
of D-laws. 45
This aspiration, I think, need not be for perfect obedience, but for
something very close to it. Raz gives an extended discussion of the
difficulties in determining the threshold level,46 but I pass over these.
The aspiration, at least, should be for near-total compliance. I say
"near-total" primarily because of an empirical fact: it seems to be the
case that some particular laws are enacted with the expectation that
they will be broken. 47 The most obvious examples come from the traffic
and parking context-it is often understood, and desired, that a fairly
healthy amount of disobedience will result, and that the government
will reap the rewards that come from the collection of a monetary
sanction. Beyond this, these rules where disobedience is nearly
ubiquitous are often promulgated with the intention of providing tools

43. See JOSEPHRAz, Law andAuthority, in THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 1, 28-33 (1979)
[hereinafter Law and Authority], for a discussion on law making "claims". See also Scott
Hershovitz, The Authority ofLaw, in THE ROUTLEDGE COMPANION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF
LAW 18 n.33 (Univ. of Mich. Law Sch. Pub. Law and Legal Theory Working Paper Series,
Working
Paper
No.
232,
2011),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract-id=1781271 ("I frequently indulge a personification of the lawspeaking of what it claims or is owed-that shouldbe understood as a shorthand for what
the state orlegal officialsclaim orare owed.").Tothe extentthatthe ideaof law having
an "aspiration" can be challenged by reductionist theories, I answer that my theory (and,
of course, Raz's theory) can profit from recent work on collective action and mental states.
See generally CHRISTIAN LIST & PHILIP PETTIT, GROUPAGENCY: THE PossIBLITY, DESIGN
AND STATUS OF CORPORATE AGENTS (2011).

44. The Nature of Law and NaturalLaw, supranote 29, at 199-201.
45. Raz uses these labels to describe the work that different rules do. S-laws are
sanction-stipulating laws, P-laws are power-conferring laws, and D-laws are dutyimposing laws. His typology is even more complicated, and has other categories as well.
See THE CONCEPT OF A LEGAL SYSTEM, supra note 14, at 147-67.

46. Id. at 203. Raz notes the various questions that arise: is it merely a ratio of
obedience to non-obedience? Is this with respect solely to D-Laws or other types as w ell?
Still, Raz believes the threshold question is an important one to ask, and that it should
not be scrapped-he only urges caution. See JEROME HALL, FOUNDATIONS OF
JURISPRUDENCE 170 (1973), for a discussion on the difficulty in measuring effectiveness

and determining thresholds.
47. Mich. Law Review Ass'n, Laws That Are Made to be Broken: Adjusting for
Anticipated Noncompliance, 75 MICH. L. REV. 687,688 (1977), http://www.jstor.orgstable/
1287911.
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for policing, like a "drag net" to enable greater discretion. 48 In both of
these cases, though, it is expected that the system will be fully
efficacious. Achieving the purposes of the money-driven parking laws,
after all, depends upon the total obedience of the citizen after the
violation: he is expected to answer the summons, and to pay the fine
when requested. Moreover, the judge is expected to do his duties in
assessing that fee. While one can imagine examples of particular laws
whose raison d'etre is some further goal in which disobedience is an
instrumental means, these are anomalies, and they depend upon the
efficacy of the overall system for the fulfillment of that goal. It would be
impossible to imagine an entire system that presupposes and hopes for
inefficacy. Given these considerations, we can say that all legal systems
aspire to near-perfect efficacy through near-total obedience.
What has just been said is probably uncontroversial, but what I
hope to add in this paper is something more-if this "aspiration," as we
have called it, is really genuine and present, then the legal system will
necessarily adapt to the circumstances in which it expects to be applied.
Because the change in the form of a legal system can never guarantee
any external results, the best manifestation of adaptability that is
possible is an internal one. But precisely because it is within the power
of a legal system to internally change its form so effortlessly (i.e.,
theoretically including P-laws or S-laws in addition to D-laws), it does
not seem odd to expect that a system of rules, if it indeed aspires to
near-total efficacy, must use this power to work towards that aspiration.
If no positive effort is made towards the accomplishment of an
aspiration, yet an attempt is itself easily within reach, it makes sense to
conclude that the aspiration is absent. This would be like an individual
who, claiming to have a deep-seated goal of attending university, never
even bothers to sign up for the admissions test.
It is difficult to demonstrate this proposition by way of argument. If
an individual or an entity genuinely possesses a goal, then it seems
obvious that it must work towards its fulfillment (absent other
considerations). A failure to do so would belie the commitment to the
underlying goal. Recall that we are not asking much in requesting that
a legal system make "internal" adaptations-this does not demand
48.

This instinct has been voiced in a recent U.S. Supreme Court decision. See

generally Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 566 U.S. 318, 334-35 (2012) ("People
detained for minor offenses can turn out to be the most devious and dangerous criminals.
Hours after the Oklahoma City bombing, Timothy McVeigh was stopped by a state
trooper who noticed he was driving without a license plate. Police stopped serial killer
Joel Rifkin for the same reason. One of the terrorists involved in the September 11
attacks was stopped and ticketed for speeding just two days before hijacking Flight 93."
(citations omitted)).
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actual application, only codification. These will almost never set back
the goal of efficacy-they can only tend to advance it, even if the
amount that they do so is not necessarily certain or guaranteed to be
great. Thus, I go beyond what Lamond proposes-that law always
"claims the right to authorize j] enforcement"49-and think that law
must actually exercise that right, to whatever effect, in circumstances
where the authorization of enforcement is necessary to advance efficacy.
This theory does not say that the vagaries of obedience by external
forces can validate or invalidate law (this is the common objection), but
that the law's ex post reaction to those vagaries, in the form of an
internal adaptation, is evidence of anterior conceptual legal validity. It
is proof positive of a genuine aspiration of efficacy.
Internal adaptations can take various forms. One is more
institutional and ex ante: it seeks prevention. We might imagine a legal
system providing for a framework whereby all citizens are gradually
habituated towards law-abidingness. If the angelic polity's denizens had
fallen from law-abidingness, but required only that newly born
generations be (compulsively) re-educated, and these beings were
amenable to such molding, such a sanctionless system of rules still
seems legal; it contemplates the institution of a re-education
mechanism that is the least invasive alternative. Many other ex ante or
preventative measures might be imagined, and I only caution that for
them to manifest a true "legal" aspiration, as we have defined it, these
measures must be directed at the entire political community, and be
generally indexed to the actual circumstances on the ground. Were the
newborn angels incorrigible, such institutions would hardly be
sufficient.
The most common adaptations, though, will be those of an ex post,
corrective nature. These will provide for legally constituted responses or
reactions to behavior with respect to the primary conduct rules. They
could take the form of rewards or praise for compliance, or various
critical reactions in the event of disobedience: punishment, nullity,
shaming, expressions of disapproval, outcasting, supervision, and
beyond.50 Again, though, the choices of one of these over another (or
49. See Lamond, supra note 3, at 55 (emphasis added and in the original).
50. Discussions about the forms sanctions and critical responses can take abound. See
HALL, supra note 46, at 108-12, where he suggests that beyond physical force, public
confession, admonishments, warnings, social censure, and psychological coercion. He
gives many actualexamples of such critical responses in socialpractice. Id. The choice of
how the law reacts can vary contingently with the circumstances. See Hans Oberdiek, The
Role of Sanctions and Coercion in UnderstandingLaw and Legal Systems, 21 AM. J.
JURIS. 71, 73 (1976); Norberto Bobbio, The PromotionofActionin the Modern State, in
LAW, REASON, AND JUSTICE 189, 199 (Graham Huges ed., 1969). Bobbio urges that law
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perhaps a combination) must in some way reflect the reality of the type
51
of beings upon whom the system of rules is being imposed. Thus, in
our contemporary criminal law, ruling as it does over human beings
constituted a certain way, if the critical response imposed for
disobedience were simply one of a letter of reprimand, this would be no
real adaptation at all. However, were such seemingly toothless
measures actually geared towards the circumstances in which they
were applied, I would not think that system to be non-legal. In a small
indigenous community where shame is considered worse than suffering
and death, the imposition of such a critical response is actually more
appropriate than one of physical punishment.
In saying that adaptations must be appropriately indexed to the
actual circumstances in which the legal system is expected to be
instantiated, we have so far focused only on the character of the citizen
over which the system will rule. Closely related is the type of conduct
rule with which the critical (or positive) response deals. We already see
such distinctions made in the gradations of punishments in our
contemporary criminal law-some offenses are met with fines, others
with prison, and still others with execution. In less "humane" societies,
there are many more gradations between the latter two. Similarly,
there are distinctions between criminal punishment and the civil
imposition of money damages, and public law involves even more subtle
mechanisms. 52 Different conduct rules demand different legal responses
in the event of disobedience, because the value protected by the rules
are not all of equal import.
Somewhere in between the matrix of the type of the conduct rule
and the character of the citizen there coalesces an appropriate response
can also seek to stimulate conformity, encourage desirable acts, make prohibited acts
seem repugnant, and give great rewards to those whogo above and beyond. He calls these
forms "active control"instead of "passive control," which waits for disobedienc to kick in.
Bobbio, supra, at 200. See JEREMYBENTHAM, OF LAws IN GENERAL 134 (H.L.A. Hart e d.,
1970), for an early discussion of rewards. For a recent discussion of rewards, see
SCHAUER, supranote 1, at 7-8.
51. Here we couldborrow a conceptfromHart. In his discussion of what gives rise to
obligation, he notes that the "seriousness" of the social pressure brought to bear in the
critical reaction is whatis important. HART, supranote 6, at 86. These do not necessarily
need to be physical, but must be serious, and should involve a sacrifice of something of
self-interest. Id. While Hart was speaking of obligation, we could transpose this notion of
"seriousness" to our current discussion of adaptations to advance efficacy. See THE
CONCEPT OF ALEGAL SYSTEM, supranote 14, at 148, on the issue of seriousness.
52. Compare Shapiro & Hathaway, supra note 15, at 278-79 (mentioning judicial
review, impeachment threats, elections, supervisionby higher officials, and defundin g or
budget control), with Yankah, supm note 20, at 1215 (stating that there are no sanctions
in public law because they are "impractical" and officials obey out of a sense of duty
anyway).
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for disobedience. While differing circumstances-coming from an
amalgamation of factors, most importantly the two just mentionedwarrant differing responses from a legal system so as to advance
efficacy, what is common in every case is the adaptation, the
manifestation of the underlying aspiration.
Before moving on, it is worth briefly adding two clarifications. In
saying that law must aspire to be efficacious, I am not saying that this
aspiration is merely a "claim" to efficacy, nor am I saying that it is
derivative of law's claim to authority. The feature I identify must
manifest itself in a more concrete form than a "claim"-it often
demands substantive modification of the legal system. Moreover,
authority is a separate category of analysis entirely. While Raz
convincingly argues that law must "claim[] legitimate authority," 53 he
emphasizes that efficacy is "not entailed" by a conceptual analysis of the
notion of authority." 54 Thus, even a "claim" to efficacy, to the extent that
this makes any sense (efficacy is an empirical reality unaffected by
mere claims), would be unrelated to a claim of legitimate authority.
Efficacy's relationship to the claim to authority is that of a mere
byproduct: the legitimacy-claim leads to efficacy through its persuasive
influence.5 5
V. ASPIRATIONS & INDIVIDUATION: SOCIAL PRACTICE

Now that the theory has been discerned from the comparison of
thought experiments and also given more nuance by way of positive
argument, it is appropriate to test it in the more complicated area of
53. Law and Authority, supranote 43, at 28.
54. Id. at 8-9 ("1 share the belief that a legitimate political authority is of necessity
effective at least to a degree. But this is a result of substantivepoliticalprinciples (e.g.
that one of the main justifications for having a political authority is its usefulness in
securing social co-ordination, and that knowledge and expertise do not give onearight to
govern and play only a subordinate role in the justification of political authority). It is not
entailedby a conceptual analysisof the notionof authority,not even by that of the concept
of political authority." (emphasis added)); see also TheNature of Law and Natural Law,
supranote 29, at 87-88. Raz noted that:
acceptance of a claim to legitimate authority is. . . a logically necessary condition
for the existence of a de facto authority.... A common factor in all kinds of
effective authority is that they involve a belief by some that the person concerned
has legitimate authority. Therefore, the explanationof effective authority
presupposes that of legitimate authority.
Law and Authority, supranote 43, at 28-29.
55. Law and Authority, supra note 43, at 28-29 ("A common factor in all kinds of
effective authority is that they involve a belief by some that the person concerned has
legitimate authority. Therefore, the explanation of effective authority presupposes that of
legitimate authority." (footnote omitted)).
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social practice. First, we will look at different types of law, and will find
that the theory adequately explains why there are both sanctionless
and sanctioning bodies of law within most existing legal systems. After
this, we will turn to a comparison of clearly non-legal rules systems
with that of law, and similarly find that the theory can do much of the
delineating work. Finally, certain ostensible anomalies will be
addressed, and important but non-fatal limitations upon the theory will
emerge.
Beginning with the different types of law within a single legal
system, the most ubiquitous example of the dichotomy between
sanctioning and sanctionless codes existing side-by-side is that of the
criminal and the public laws. Can the aspiration of efficacy explain why
the former almost always relies upon harsh critical reactions, and the
latter is nearly devoid of them?
Conduct rules delineating what we think of as "criminal" conduct
almost certainly require coercive sanctions because they deal with
beings subject to the "problem of bad character,"5 6 and with conduct
that-through force or fraud-is usually a direct temptation to that
"infirmit[y] of human nature." 5 7 A complex idea, the problem of bad
character was most crucially relied upon (and fully developed) in
Hobbes, Locke, and Hume.5 8 Shapiro summarizes the variants of this
theory well:
Hobbes argued, for example, that the state of nature is a state
of war because men are greedy and vain. In their desire to
dominate others as well as protect themselves, they inevitably
disregard their covenants of nonaggression and launch
preemptive attacks against those who might attack them first.
Locke also thought that individuals in the state of nature would
act aggressively. Unlike Hobbes, however, he did not think they
would do so out of callous disregard for the natural law but
rather as a result of self-deception. Since people are often biased
in their own favor, each side in a dispute will judge themselves
justified and hence be unwilling to yield .... Similarly, Hume
believed that, in the absence of government, people will tend to
ignore the principles of justice., Hume attributed this
noncompliance largely to irrationality: people often heavily

56.

SHAPIRO, supranote 16, at 173.
57. Id. at 174.
58. Id. Of course, itis prevalent throughout the historyof political thought, and was
there even at the beginning. See BrennerM. Fissell, The JustificationofPositive Law in
Plato, AM. J. JURIS. 89, 89 (2011).
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discount the future and seek to maximize short-term benefit
over long-term gain.59
Finnis also highlights the justification for these types of laws,
writing, "The 'goal' of the familiar modern systems of criminal law can
only be described as a certain . . . quality of communal life in which the

demands of the common good indeed are unambiguously and insistently
preferred to selfish indifference or individualistic demands for licence
"60 I hesitate to boil down this problem into any one human
characteristic; instead, these thinkers have placed their fingers upon a
constellation of deleterious qualities, all of which seem to form the
raison d'8tre of the criminal law.61
It is no surprise that the conduct flowing from (and most gratifying
to) the problem of bad character is also that which the criminal law
most commonly prohibits; here the "solution" is usually simple
"prohibition" (the criminal law rarely asks us to do anything absent
other factors), and the violation of a prohibition is perhaps the most
egregious form of law-breaking, and strongly deserves retribution. 62
Hart also reminds us, importantly, that sanctions in these cases of
antisocial behavior speak not merely as prohibitive warning to violator,
but as guarantor to the obedient:
"Sanctions"

are

.

.

.

required

not

as

a normal

motive

for

obedience but as a guarantee that those who would voluntarily
obey shall not be sacrificed to those who would not. To obey,
without this, would be to risk going to the wall. Given this
standing danger, what reason demands is voluntary cooperation
in a coercive system. 63
In these cases, then, the character of the citizen and the type of the
conduct at issue (our two primary criteria for judging internal
adaptations) both strongly militate in favor of the most serious of
critical reactions the law can level. The problem of bad character leads
to conduct that threatens the social fabric, and the violation of such
59. SHAPIRO, supranote 16, at 174.
60. FINNIS, supranote 14, at261.
61. Of course, human motivations are infinitely complex, and the "interests" that a
criminal code protects can be similarly divergent from our core case-I am speaking, like
Finnis, of most cases most of the time, in the "familiar" and "modern" criminal law.
62. See MICHAEL S. MOORE, Acr AND CRIME 54-56 (Tony Honor6 & Joseph Raz e ds.,
1993), for a discussion of omissions as less wrongful from a retributivist standpoint.
63. HART, supra note 6, at 198. This is also echoed in Lamond's article, where he
discusses the needto restrict socially destructive violence. Lamond, supranote 3, at 4546.

1646

RUTGERS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69:1627

prohibitions gravely undermines these laws' purposes. Because of this,
anything less than serious sanctions would be greatly insufficient (given
the circumstances), and would not count as a true manifestation of the
aspiration.
The public law-that body of rules governing officials-however, is
generally agreed to lack anything comparable to the harsh sanctions of
the criminal law. 64 This is not because the public law possesses no
aspiration to be efficacious, but is because the different circumstances
alter the calculus.
Here the body of law similarly rules over human beings afflicted by
the problem of bad character, but the type of conduct it regulates seems
far less titillating to that infirmity. In the ordinary cases, the official
qua official has little to gain by violating the public law (either through
failure to enforce, or through a perverted version of enforcement). Yes,
under-the-table corruption will always present private or personal
temptations, but from a purely institutional perspective, an official has
no personal stake in violation. The police chief and the judge, in their
official capacities, gain nothing by failing to do their jobs or doing them
wrong. While temptation might exist, it exists in a greatly diluted form
when compared to the conduct proscribed by the criminal law: one
would need hyper-realist eyes to see a President's unconstitutional act
as merely existing on a spectrum alongside the robber's crime.
There is another consideration, though, that buttresses this
observation-alongside the problem of bad character there is another
human impulse that comes into play with public law. This is the desire
to fulfill one's official duties, or at least to be seen as doing so. The
possibility of this reward of esteem does not have an analogue in the
criminal context, as merely obeying the norms of the criminal law
generally brings no approbation.
The robes of office, then, both reduce temptation and inspire dutythey replace public concerns with private, thus helping to suppress the
problem of bad character while encouraging the potential for good
character. To these, we can add the presence of a multiplicity of soft
alternatives to sanctions: elections, managerial oversight, budgetary
64. Again, the repeated reference to "sanctions" should not confuse. The aspiration of
efficacy does not collapse into a simple test of whether or not sanctions are pre sent; if it
appears this way, it is only because the most common examples I have of a legal system's
adaptability all involve these criticalresponses. Thisisitself a function of their common
human setting, where sanctions are so necessaryandappropriate. If we remember, with
Hart, though, that the concept of law is not dependent upon "human nature," then it is
clear that there are other possible ways for a system to manifest its aspiration to be come
efficacious: the notion does not map simply onto the presence or absence of sanctions. See
generally HART, supranote 6.
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powers, and impeachment all work to ensure greater compliance. 6 5 In
such a setting, coercive sanctions become far less necessary, with the
variety of factors described above all creating an atmosphere of efficacy
that is not mirrored in the regulation of private conduct.
In both the criminal and the public law, the aspiration of efficacy is
present, but the circumstances of each code's application changes the
form of the efficacy-aimed adaptations each chooses to use. Changing
the assumptions of our examples, we find that the conclusions might
change as well. Were a drug invented that eradicated "the problem of
bad character," much of the criminal law would need to respond with
far less than coercive physical sanctions, and it would still retain its
legality. Similarly, if the execution of one's official duties within the
public law came to be seen as a distressing burden, greater incentives
(or disincentives) would be required to save the system from slipping
into invalidity. We might, with Shapiro, summarize the dichotomy as
one of different levels of trust: "plans . . . are sophisticated devices for

managing trust and distrust: they allow people to capitalize on the faith
they have in others or compensate for its absence."6 6 Certain subjects of
legislation will allow for trust-capitalization, while others need trustcompensation. The reasons will always be complicated, and I highlight
only two salient examples.
Just as this idea can help to account for the differing types of law
within an existing legal system, so too does it help delineate between
that system and other clearly non-legal bodies of rules. An important
foil for any discussion of legal validity is the proliferation of elaborate
religious codes of conduct. Almost all of these codes are normative, and
most claim authority over the entirety of the human race.67 How can

65. Shapiro & Hathaway, supra note 15, at 278. With these authors, I place such
mechanisms outside the category of "sanction," in that they are not automatically and
legally specified as responses to the given conduct. The possibility of criminal liability for
officials' omissions is very small. Most related statutes punish actionstaken under "color
of law," see 18 U.S.C. § 242 (2006), butit is possible to conceive of a conspiracy whereby
some officials' omissions protect or conceal harmful actions through their non -enforcement
of law. See Shapiro & Hathaway, supra note 15, at 278. In any case, these are far and
away the rarest forms of respondingto official action and inaction, and my claim is only
that the public law generally does not stipulate sanctions.
66. SHAPIRO, supra note 16, at 334.
67. See, e.g., CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH (2d ed. 1997) IT 2032-36.
"To the Church belongs the right always and everywhere to announce moral
principles, including those pertaining to the social order, andto make judgments
on any human affairs to the extent that they are required by the fundamental
rights of the human person or the salvation of souls."

1648

RUTGERS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69:1627

these clearly non-legal systems be differentiated from law, when they
seem to possess so many similar characteristics? The notion of the
aspiration of efficacy is helpful. A nearly ubiquitous feature of these
religious systems of rules is that they are routinely disobeyed and are
extremely inefficacious, but even in the face of such realities the codes
make no provision for any adaptations that are appropriately measured
towards rectifying this deficiency. The most that any religious systems
do to respond to disobedience is something like excommunication-the
incorrigible heretic or atheist is merely told he will burn in Hell, and is
denied membership in the religion. The former (damnation), given the
experience of history, clearly no longer carries enough weight to
constitute a genuine adaptation towards efficacy, and the latter
(ostracism), while somewhat coercive, is similarly too easy a pill to
swallow in a pluralist society where community identities are only
weakly tied to churches. 68 These are essentially toothless responses to
disobedience. To the extent that we could imagine (or, in the case of
history, recall) religious systems where their critical responses were
much more acutely felt, we might even be ready to call those systems
"legal."6 9
Turning to social rule systems outside of the religious context, the
concept of the aspiration of efficacy has similar delineating power. With
most non-legal social groups, and most non-legal social rules (such as
etiquette), it seems absent. With groups and clubs, the greatest critical
response they can muster is expulsion, and this seems insufficient for
the same reasons mentioned above. Social rules, moreover, respond to

The authority of the Magisterium extends also to the specific precepts of the
naturallaw, because their observance, demandedby the Creator, is necessary for
salvation.
Id.
68. Yankah, supra note 20, at 1241. In communities characterized by a ho mo ge no us
and non-mainstream ideology (especially where geographic isolation results), the coercive
force of course increases. This is not the case in most modern jurisdictions. But see Morris
B. Hoffman & Timothy H. Goldsmith, The BiologicalRootsof Punishment, 1 OHIO ST. J.
CRIM. L. 627,637 (2004).
Protestants carriedon many of the most severe forms of ostracism, especially the
Lutherans and Calvinists. Indeed, in Calvin's own Geneva, the most severeform
of excommunication combined the ecclesiastical excommunicato major with a
complete barring of social relations and expulsion from the city-state. Remnants
of this severe formof Protestant ostracism found their way to our shores with the
Pilgrims, and persist in modern times in the shunning, or "meidung," practiced by
the Old World Amish.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
69. Certainly, whenever the rules of the religion take on such an important role in the
community that they are enforcedby the State, as in a theocracy, those rules have beame
laws.
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disobedience only with the collective visitation of obloquy, and in
today's society, again, this is not enough. 70 As Yankah writes, "A
person's decision to regard as necessary the esteem of his friends or
social peers seems closer to a set of personal reasons from which he may
opt out than those reasons that are imposed regardless of his
relationship." 71 There doesn't seem to be enough "bite" in these
responses for us to regard them as proper adaptations.
There is one non-legal system of rules that does seem to aspire to be
efficacious, though, and a consideration of this system provides an
opportunity for the introduction of an important limiting qualifier to
our thesis. This is the jurisprudential trope of the Mafia boss, and the
strictures he imposes upon his henchmen. While we could try an easy
attempt at distinction, and take note of the Mafia boss's somewhat
limited aspiration (he aims only to control his own group, not the entire
political community), at least within that group, it seems as if he does
meet the test. When the criminal organization's member disobeys, often
even in the slightest way, it is met with harsh physical punishment.
This ruthless use of physical force in the event of disobedience, usually
to serve utilitarian ends of general deterrence within the group, shows
clearly that the "code" is entirely serious about its aspiration of neartotal efficacy. Still, Mafia bosses' rules are no "law." 72 By bringing the
Mafia system into the discussion, an important limitation upon the
thesis is exposed, but one that I do not hesitate to accept. I make a
weaker claim than that of the sanction or coercion theorists-while I
think that the aspiration of efficacy is necessary for a legal system's
validity, I do not believe that it is entirely distinctive of legality. Thus,
any failure to easily delineate between law and other systems of rules is
not fatal. Like the quality of normativity, legal systems need this
aspiration but do not hold a monopoly on it.
To conclude, testing the theory by an application to social practice
has been instructive. The theory of the aspiration of efficacy-far from
being defeated (like sanction theories) by the dichotomy presented by
public law and criminal law-accounts for both codes and helps to
explain their differing features. With respect to delineation between
legal and non-legal systems, I believe that the aspiration of efficacy can
also do a great deal of this work, and is able to distinguish law from
70. However, we could imagine cases where it might be, as in the indigenous tribe
mentioned earlier.
71. Yankah, supra note 20, at 1241.
72. But see id. at 1240. Yankah thinks that the Mafia actually aspires to issue laws
and that its rules seem somewhat law-like. Id. If it were to abscond to the desert, he
argues, it would probably be seen as something like a separatist or revolutionary
movement that indeed promulgated laws for itself. Id.
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religious and other social rule systems. One place where the theory falls
short is in the context of organized crime. What this tells us is that the
aspiration is quite important in determining legality, but has some
limits: it is necessary but not distinctive. Overall, by looking at actual
social practices, the theory that was first hinted at by a juxtaposition of
more simplified thought experiments is confirmed and made more
elaborate.
VI. SOCIAL PRACTICE CONTINUED: UNMANIFESTED ASPIRATIONS

While a look to social practice has helped to confirm the thesis, it
also complicates it. There are at least two cases in which genuinely
extant aspirations of efficacy will nevertheless be unmanifested (even in
the case of widespread disobedience), and while neither doom the
thesis, both reveal important qualifiers on it.
The first situation is one that we could call a case of competing
aspirations. It seems to be true that in some cases a particular law will
not manifest its aspiration of efficacy in a substantial enough way, but
its drafters nevertheless expect it to be obeyed. This is not like the
traffic and parking codes discussed above, where violations are
deliberately anticipated as salubrious-in these cases, rather, a bona
fide aspiration of efficacy is outweighed by competing aspirations that
temper the manifestation. Thus, many trivial offenses are widely
disobeyed, but the law, balancing the interests served by the rule and
the downsides of certain forms of critical reactions (such as affronts to
privacy or dignity), deems it inappropriate to impose Draconian
measures to enforce them. 73 The prohibition on marijuana usage is
widely inefficacious, but it is likely that efficacy could be greatly
enhanced by providing for caning in the event of a violation. Our system
does not do this, though, and for good reasons.
Cases like these do not defeat our theory. These are not cases of an
absent aspiration of efficacy-it is present but is merely overborne. The
complexities of social life force us to recognize that there are many
societal aspirations at work, and while efficacy usually trumps, that is
not always true. These two statements, then-that the necessary
aspiration of efficacy will always tend towards the creation of
manifestations and that in some cases no manifestations will in fact

73. See Douglas Husak, The CriminalLaw as Last Resort, 24 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD.
207, 234 (2004), for a general discussion of this intuition as it relates to the imposition of
criminal sanctions. "The criminal law is different and must be evaluated by a higher
standard of justification because it burdens interests not implicated when other modes of
social control are employed... ." Id. (footnote omitted).
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occur-are not irreconcilable. As with the marijuana case, one should
not believe that the failure to provide for caning reflects an absence of a
desire for obedience. Instead, it is that human dignity has been judged
to be of a higher value in the specific case.
The second case of a non-manifested aspiration is that of the
external emergency. External crises, usually temporary in nature, might
result in widespread disobedience-most especially through the use of
coercion.7 4 Imagine the angelic polity, but with the forced imposition of
a tyrant's edicts after an invasion. The angelic citizens would be coerced
into disobeying their own law, but we do not expect that system of rules
to adopt a more severe version of sanctions so as to maintain legal
validity. We would not think that the original system no longer aspires
to be efficacious, either; it is simply that supervening external forces
have suppressed it (just as the countervailing aspiration had done so in
the earlier case).
Such extreme situations reveal an important feature of the theory.
In order to show a genuine aspiration, the legal system must be
responsive only to those normal, internal circumstances that obtain
most of the time. If the inefficacy is not related to the character of the
citizen or the type of the conduct rule (or the other normal internal
factors at work), but is imposed by some external emergency, a
manifestation is not expected. By incorporating this qualifier, our
picture of the "circumstances" of law's instantiation becomes more
nuanced.
The two cases of unmanifested aspirations reaffirm something that
has already been hinted at: in the end, the adaptations or
manifestations are mainly of evidentiary value, and are not themselves
touchstones of validity. While still tremendously important, and in
almost all cases they can and must be present in order for the observer
to validly infer that a genuine aspiration of efficacy exists, as we have
just seen there will be narrow instances where they are properly
eschewed.75
74. Another possible example wouldbe the changedrationalcalculations that follow
from emergent circumstances such as a natural disaster. We might imagine a scenario in
which the entire community was flooded. Previously, the use of waterraft was restricted
to those with a license or permit, and this was enforced through a nominal fine. Now,
during the flood, everyone turnsto boats and violates the law. We hardly expect the le gal
system to reactby providing for harsher sanctions to counteract this disobedience. This is
less pure of a case than that of external coercion, though, as it is not as clear that there is
still an aspiration of efficacy here.
75. By opening the door to these exceptions, though, a more general qualifier should
be added: this theory does not purport to establish a necessary feature of legal validity in
all possible worlds, where only the dictates of logic remain fixed. I only hope to argue that
it makes sense in all "close" worlds, where the spectrum of possible conditions is cabined
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In sum, by looking at actual social practice our thesis has been
confirmed, but it has also become more precise. Important qualifiers
have been discovered: (1) the aspiration can at most be for near-total
efficacy, (2) it is necessary for legality but is not distinctive of it, (3) it is
not the only aspiration in a political community, and can be outweighed
(resulting in an absence of any manifested changes), and (4) internal
adaptations that manifest the aspiration need only be indexed to the
normal circumstances of application, which do not include external
emergencies.
VII. CONCLUSION
Analytic debates surrounding the necessity of sanctions and efficacy
in contemporary jurisprudence are somewhat distracting: these
questions could be derivative of something lurking in the background.
Read together, discussions of sanctions and efficacy reveal what may be
an underlying aspect of the concept of law, and one that can help to
bridge the gap between the two extreme positions that have been taken
by theorists. This aspect is the aspiration of efficacy. This is hinted at
by a juxtaposition of various thought experiments, and it provides a
coherent way to delineate between them, but it is confirmed and
elaborated by an application to social practices. A legal system must
aspire to be efficacious, and this is manifested by internal adaptations
appropriate for the circumstances of the legal system's instantiation.
These internal adaptations can take many forms, either ex ante
preventative or ex post corrective, so long as they are indexed to
advance efficacy in a way that accurately reflects the world in which
they will be applied. The aspiration, then, is an internal quality that is
evidenced by the rule system's actual provisions, and is not merely a
claim that is derivative of law's larger claim to legitimate authority.
to something somewhat similar to our own lived reality. See generally JOHN DIVERS,
POSSIBLE WORLDS (2002), for a discussion of "close" and "distant" worlds. Thus, by using
the labels "angels" and "demons," I do not mean some wholly different being-not
something like Shapiro's aliens. See SHAPIRO, supra note 16, at 406-07 ("Social science
cannot tellus what the law is because it studies human society. Its deliverances have no
relevance to the legal philosopher because it is a truism that nonhumans could have law.
Science fiction, for example, is replete with stories involving alien civilizations with some
form of legal system. These examples show that it is part of our concept of law that groups
can have legal systems provided they are more or less rational agents and have the ability
to follow rules"). They are merely labels usedto describe an otherwise human-like citizen
who happens to be perfectly obedient or disobedient. For beings mostly like humans, then,
in a world that is mostly like our own, the thesis holds true. To claim that law must
aspire to efficacy is not a statement about the intrinsic meaningof law, but rather about
the natureof law in this or in close worlds.

